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THE INFLUENCE OF R&D INVESTMENT AND 
DIVIDEND PAYMENT TAX INCENTIVES ON 
CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
M. Catherine Cleaveland, Mercer University 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Although much research on corporate dividend policy exists, the evidence is far from 
conclusive. Understanding how dividend taxes affect firm-level decisions is crucial to evaluating 
dividend imputation credits which provide shareholder-level tax credits for dividends received or 
decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates, which reduce the double taxation of dividends. 
Using changes in New Zealand and Australia’s tax regimes, this paper provides new insight into 
the corporate dividend policy views. The results support the double taxation and tax irrelevance 
corporate dividend policy views in dividend-paying firms operating in a tax regime with dividend 
imputation and capital gains taxes. By documenting a significant decrease in R&D investment 
and increase in dividend payment after a change in dividend taxes, this paper also highlights a 
void in the current corporate dividend policy views and demonstrates the need for the inclusion 
of R&D investment. In New Zealand and Australia, much of the increased dividend payment 
appears to have come from a decrease in R&D investment. Thus, if a country decides to decrease 
shareholder-level dividend taxes and the country values investment in R&D, it may need to 
consider simultaneously increasing the R&D investment incentive. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The role shareholder-level taxes play in corporations’ decisions to pay dividends is still 
debated in academic research. Since Black (1976) posed the questions of why corporations pay 
dividends given their tax disadvantages and why investors appear to pay attention to them, 
researchers have tried to explain corporations’ dividend policies (McKenzie and Thompson, 
1997; Miller and Scholes, 1978). Poterba and Summers (1985, 1) reiterate Black’s ideas, and 
they demonstrate that when governments tax corporate profits at the corporate level and again 
when they are distributed to shareholders as dividends, corporations should not pay dividends. 
Shareholders should prefer that corporations retain earnings where they can continue to be 
invested by the corporation and increase the corporation’s value (Poterba and Summers, 1985). 
Since paying dividends is common among U.S. corporations, corporate dividend policy is 
obviously not this straightforward (Poterba, 1987; John and Williams, 1985; Poterba and 
Summers, 1985). 
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Three perspectives on how shareholder-level taxes affect firms’ corporate dividend policy 
dominate the literature: the tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalization (or residual) view, and the 
double taxation view (McKenzie and Thompson, 1997; Zodrow, 1991; Poterba, 1987; Poterba 
and Summers, 1985). These three views differ as to why corporations pay dividends, how 
dividend taxes at the shareholder-level affect dividend payment, and what changes in 
shareholder-level dividend tax policy mean for corporate investment.  
 Utilizing natural experimental settings in Australia and New Zealand, this paper 
demonstrates that the R&D investment and dividend payments vary according to the country’s 
tax incentives for R&D investment and taxation of dividend payments. The results support the 
double taxation and tax irrelevance views in dividend-paying firms operating in a tax regime 
with dividend imputation and capital gains taxes. This paper also documents significant 
decreases in R&D investment when a tax regime provides dividend implementation but does not 
provide explicit incentives for R&D investment. Thus, if a country decides to decrease 
shareholder-level dividend taxes and the country values investment in R&D, consideration 
should be given to simultaneously increasing the R&D investment incentive. Current dividend 
policy views do not include R&D investment in their predictions, and researchers tend to add it 
to capital investment to determine a firm’s overall investment. This paper documents the 
importance of looking at R&D investment separate from capital investment. 
This paper proceeds by further explaining the tax changes in New Zealand and Australia. 
It then reviews each of the three corporate dividend policy views. A literature review of the three 
corporate dividend policy views then demonstrates that the evidence is inconclusive. The 
hypotheses are developed and followed by a discussion of the data and analysis. Lastly, the 
results are presented and implications of the paper and its findings are discussed. 
 
COUNTRY SETTINGS 
 
Effective July 1985, Australia implemented R&D super-deductibility which permitted 
companies to deduct 150 percent of their R&D cost if the total annual R&D expenditure was 
greater than 20,000 Australian dollars and the company registered with the Industry Research 
and Development Board (Parliament of Australia: Senate Committee Report on Business 
Taxation Reform, 1999). As shown in Table 1, Panel A, prior to July of 1985, firms were 
permitted to deduct 100 percent of R&D. In July 1987, Australia implemented an incentive for 
dividend payments known as a dividend imputation credit (Table 1, Panel B). A dividend 
imputation credit reduces the double taxation of dividends by providing shareholder-level tax 
credits for dividends received or decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates. The dividend tax 
credit enabled shareholders to receive a credit known as a “franking credit” for the portion of 
dividends paid out of a company’s after-tax profit or “franked dividends” (Petty et al., 2000, 30).  
Although Australia refers to its imputation credit as a franking credit, to be consistent with the 
terminology in the literature, this paper continues to refer to it as an imputation credit. Thus, 
shareholders calculated their imputed credit on fully-franked dividends as follows:  
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Imputation Credit =  
Dividends *  Company tax rate
1 -  Company tax rate
 
 
Shareholders report the amount of the “franked dividend” they receive plus the 
imputation credit in their gross incomes (where the addition of the imputation credit “grosses up” 
the dividend received to a before-tax amount). They then claim the imputation credit against 
their tax liability (Petty et al., 2000, 31). For example, in 1988 when the maximum corporate and 
individual tax rates were both 48 percent, without dividend imputation, an Australian individual 
receiving a dividend of $100 from an Australian corporation in the 48 percent tax bracket would 
have reported $100 in gross income and been liable for $48.00 in taxes. However, with dividend 
imputation, the individual reported not only the $100 in gross income but also the $92.31 
imputation credit, calculated according to the above equation. The resulting $192.31 total 
increase in gross income, increased the individual shareholder’s tax before credits by $92.31 (i.e. 
$192.31 times 48 percent individual tax rate). This $92.31 tax liability is fully offset when the 
$92.31 imputation credit is applied against it. Thus, the individual effectively received the $100 
dividend from the corporation free of additional tax. 
As summarized in Panel B of Table 1, Australia also added an individual-level capital 
gains tax in July 1987. Prior to this date, individuals only paid tax on the gain from selling shares 
if they held the shares less than 12 months. Since July 1987, when individuals hold shares over 
one year, they pay tax on the difference between the sale price and the shares’ cost, indexed for 
inflation. They then include this gain in gross income where it is taxed at regular rates. However, 
shareholders no longer pay tax on fully-franked dividends they receive while holding the stock 
(Thomas and Sellers, 1994, 87).  
Prior to April of 1988, New Zealand taxed individual residents’ worldwide taxable 
incomes, including dividends, at a three-rate scale of 15, 30, and 48 percent (Cameron, 1996). In 
April of 1988, the three-rate scale on individual residents’ worldwide incomes was reduced to a 
two-rate scale of 24 and 34 percent. As Panel C of Table 1 shows, corporate rates also fell from 
48 to 33 percent (Brash, 1996). At this time, New Zealand also implemented a dividend 
imputation credit (Prevost et al., 2002, 1100).  
Similar to Australia’s dividend imputation credit, New Zealand residents include 
dividends received plus the corporate tax on these dividends (i.e. gross-up amount) in gross 
income. They then offset their individual tax liabilities with the tax the corporation has already 
paid, i.e. imputation credit (Prevost et al., 2002, 1081). Prior to 1988, New Zealand permitted 
corporations a 100 percent deduction for R&D expenditures. While the tax changes in 1988 did 
not alter the R&D deduction, the 15 percent reduction in the maximum corporate tax rate 
reduced the value of deducting R&D expenditures (Brash, 1996). For example consider a firm 
with an income of $20,000 before their R&D expense of $1,000. Prior to the tax change the firm 
would save $480 ($1,000 * .48) in taxes via the R&D deduction; after the tax change the same 
amount of R&D expense, $1,000, would only save the firm $330 ($1,000 * .33) in taxes.  
The settings in Australia and New Zealand provide unique opportunities in which to test 
the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment. Australia went from a tax 
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regime without tax incentives for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime with a 
tax incentive only for R&D investment and then to a tax regime with tax incentives for both 
R&D investment and dividend payment. New Zealand went from a tax regime without tax 
incentives for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime offering a tax incentive for 
dividend payments. New Zealand did continue its 100 percent deduction of R&D. However, 
Thomas et al. (2003) did not classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D deduction as ones 
offering incentives for investment in R&D. For comparability, I use the same classification 
approach.  
 
Table 1:  Summary of Australian and New Zealand Tax Changes 
Panel A: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1985) 
 Prior to the Tax Change After the Tax Change 
R&D Investment Immediate deduction for 100 percent of investment 
Immediate deduction for 
150 percent of investment 
Dividends Received Taxed fully at shareholder level Same 
Capital Gains Realized 
Taxed at individual rates only if 
held for less than 12 months; 
otherwise, no tax applied 
Same 
Panel B: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1987) 
 Prior to the Tax Change After the Tax Change 
R&D Investment 
Immediate deduction for 
150 percent of investment 
above $20,000 AUS 
Same 
Dividends Received 
Taxed fully at shareholder level Credit for the portion of the 
dividend on which the corporation 
had already paid tax (“franked 
dividend”) 
Capital Gains Realized 
Taxed at individual rates only if 
held for less than 12 months; 
otherwise, no tax applied 
Taxed at the individual tax rate on 
the difference between the 
consideration received and the 
indexed cost base 
Panel C: Tax Changes in New Zealand (effective April 1988) 
 Prior to the Tax Change After the Tax Change 
R&D Investment Immediate deduction for 100 percent of investment Same 
Dividends Received 
Taxed fully at shareholder level Credit for the portion of the 
dividend on which the corporation 
had already paid tax 
Top Corporate Tax Rate 48 percent 33 percent 
 
CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY VIEWS 
  
The three views explaining why corporations pay dividends, the tax irrelevance view, the 
tax capitalization view and the double taxation view, differ in the calculation of the corporation’s 
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cost of capital and the components included in this calculation. This difference leads to varying 
predictions in the event of a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. This section reviews 
each corporate dividend policy view’s calculation of corporate cost of capital and prediction of 
alterations in behavior following a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. Table 2 
summarizes the implications for firms under each scenario according to each of the three 
corporate dividend policy views. 
 
Table 2:  Tax Change Implications for Firms Typically Paying Dividends 
Panel A: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend Imputation Credit 
 R&D Investment Capital Investment Dividend Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization No Change No Change No Change 
Double Taxation --------- Increase Increase 
Panel B: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Decrease in Corporate Tax 
Rates 
 R&D Investment Capital Investment Dividend Payment 
Tax Irrelevance --------- Increase --------- 
Tax Capitalization --------- Increase --------- 
Double Taxation --------- Increase Increase 
Panel C: Given an Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend  Imputation Credit 
 R&D Investment Capital Investment Dividend Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization No Change No Change No Change 
Double Taxation --------- Increase Increase 
Panel D: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and an Explicit Incentive for Investment in R&D, the 
Effect of Capital Gains Tax on Firms 
 R&D Investment Capital Investment Dividend Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization --------- Decrease --------- 
Double Taxation --------- --------- --------- 
Indicates no prediction. According to the dividend policy view, the variable could   increase, decrease, or 
remain the same. 
 
Tax Irrelevance View 
 
In the tax irrelevance view investors do not demand that corporations pay greater returns 
on equity instruments when shareholder-level dividend tax rates or capital gains tax rates 
decrease. Instead investors with similar tax characteristics form tax clienteles. For example, 
individuals or institutions with low shareholder-level dividend tax rates (or MTRs) hold stocks 
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with high dividend payments. Likewise investors facing high shareholder-level dividend tax rates 
will hold stocks with low dividend payments. Due to uncertainty, investors also hold some stock 
inconsistent with their tax-preferred dividend payment for diversification. Thus, a “marginal 
investor clientele” forms which is indifferent between receiving dividends or capital gains. The 
marginal investor is the investor who determines the market price of the securities under 
consideration. Under the tax irrelevance view this is the investor whose marginal tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains are virtually equal (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 11). Further, as 
clarified below, the effective shareholder-level dividend tax rate and capital gains tax rate of 
these marginal investors is zero (Poterba and Summers, 1985; Miller and Scholes, 1978; Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961). 
Miller and Scholes (1978), proponents of this view, argue that all personal taxes can be 
effectively laundered. For example, a marginal investor who is selling stock at a loss will also 
sell stock with a gain, bringing his effective capital gains rate to zero. Further, a marginal 
investor consisting of a pension fund, university, or charity pays no tax and, thus, has a zero tax 
rate on both shareholder-level dividends and capital gains. Since the effective shareholder-level 
dividend and capital gains tax rates for the marginal investor are zero, the return to the marginal 
investor for one dollar initially invested is the return on the investment after corporate-level 
taxes. Neither the shareholder-level dividend tax rate nor the capital gains tax rate factor into the 
corporation’s cost of equity capital. Since a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend 
taxes or capital gains taxes will not result in a change in the corporate cost of equity, corporate 
investments and dividend payment policies will not change.  
 
Tax Capitalization View 
 
The tax capitalization view states that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional 
tax on corporations’ profits, and thus shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share 
values (Auerbach, 1979; King, 1977). Corporations only pay dividends when they have cash 
remaining after paying all other obligations and it is the only method for them to distribute this 
trapped equity. Since an alternative tax-advantaged method of distributing the income does not 
exist, corporations finance dividends with this remaining or residual cash. In other words, 
dividends do not signal the market; they merely return trapped equity to stockholders (McKenzie 
and Thompson, 1997; Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and Summers, 1985). 
 These firms continue to use retained earnings for corporate investment until investors are 
indifferent between reinvesting within the firm and receiving additional dividends. Not paying 
dividends defers the tax on the corporation’s earnings from the original investment and causes 
stock price appreciation. This tax deferral offsets the later shareholder-level dividend tax 
(Zodrow, 1991, 500; Poterba and Summers, 1985, 15). In other words, the after-tax appreciation 
of the stock equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. For instance, if a corporation uses 
one dollar for new investment, instead of paying one dollar in dividends, the shareholder does 
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not have to pay the shareholder-level dividend tax and thus saves an amount equal to the 
shareholder-level dividend tax rate. However, the reinvested one dollar will increase the stock 
price causing the shareholder to pay a capital gains tax. In equilibrium, the cost to the 
shareholder of the corporation investing one dollar instead of paying one dollar in dividends 
equals the value of the new investment, qN, which is reflected in the stock price as follows: 
)q)(RateTax  Gains (CapitalRate)Tax  Dividend Level-rShareholde1(q NN +−=  (1)
where (1- Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax Rate) is the after-tax dividend the shareholder would 
have received if the corporation had paid dividends and (Capital Gains Tax Rate)( qN) is the 
capital gains tax the shareholder pays as a result of the increase in stock price the new corporate 
investment causes. Rewriting equation (1) in terms of the value of the corporate-level investment 
of one dollar in equilibrium results in the following:  
 
                           
RateTax  Gains Capital1
RateTax  Dividend Level-rShareholde1q N −
−=  (2 
 
Whether the corporation pays a dollar of dividends or uses it for corporate investment, the value 
to the shareholder of each initial dollar invested in the company is the same, and thus dividend 
tax policy plays a role in the value of the corporation but does not influence corporate 
investment. 
To demonstrate this, consider two scenarios, one in which the corporation pays dividends 
and one in which it foregoes paying dividends for corporate investment. In both cases the 
individual initially owns 50 shares of stock, each valued at $1.40, giving him a total stock value 
of $70. The shareholder-level dividend tax rate is 46 percent, and the capital gains tax rate is 10 
percent.   
 
Scenario A: The corporation pays a cash dividend of $1 per share.  
 
Since the dividend is paid and not used for corporate reinvestment, the value of the stock 
does not change. The individual pays $23 in shareholder-level dividend taxes [($1 dividend per 
share) (50 shares) (0.46 dividend tax rate)], receives $27 after shareholder-level dividend taxes 
[($1 dividend per share) (50 shares) – $23 shareholder-level dividend tax], and holds a total of 
$70 worth of stock.  
 
Scenario B: Instead of paying the $100 dividend, the corporation uses it for new 
investment. 
 
In accordance with equation (2), the corporate investment will cause the stock price to 
increase by $0.60 per share [($1 foregone dividend) (1 – 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax 
rate) / (1 –  0.10 capital gains tax rate)]. The individual will pay a capital gains tax of $3 [($0.60 
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share price increase) (50 shares) (0.10 capital gains tax rate)]. The individual now owns 50 
shares worth $2 each ($1.40 original stock price + $0.60 increase in stock price), for a total stock 
value of $100. Now, suppose, the individual decides to sell stock equal to his overall stock value 
increase of $30 [($0.60 increase in stock price)(50 shares)]. Since his shares each have a value of 
$2, he sells 15 shares. This leaves him with $70 worth of stock [($2 per share) (50 initial shares – 
15 sold shares)]. The total value of the stock, $70 is now the same as it was in Scenario A when 
the corporation paid a $1 dividend instead of investing it. Further, the total amount the 
shareholder has received is $27 [($30 from stock sale) – ($3 capital gains tax)], the same amount 
received in Scenario A.  
To summarize the total distribution the individual in Scenario A receives is $27 ($1 
dividend * 50 shares - $1 * 50 shares * 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax rate) which equals 
the total distribution the individual in Scenario B receives after selling the portion of stock equal 
to the capital gain:  
 
$27 Tax Gains Capital $3 - shares 50
)RateTax  Gains Capital  1.01(
Rate)Tax  Dividend Level-r  Shareholde  0.46(1 * =−
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
 
 
Now suppose that instead of selling the 15 shares in Scenario B, the individual continues 
to hold all 50 shares and the corporation pays as dividends all after-corporate-level tax returns 
from the new capital investment. The individual will receive the return on the investment, less 
corporate tax and shareholder-level dividends taxes. The individual will be content with this 
after-tax return as long as it is greater than or equal to the initial cost of each dollar of 
investment, qN , as defined in equations (1) and (2). Each period the individual’s after-tax return 
will be determined by the rate of return of the new corporate investment, the corporate tax rate 
and the shareholder-level dividend tax rate. Again, the individual will expect this after-tax return 
to equal the initial cost of the investment, qN, leading to the following equation: 
 
Rate)Tax  Dividend Level-rShareholde -1(*Rate)Tax  Corporate(1 *Return of RateTax -Before
                                        
RateTax  Gains Capital-1
RateTax  Dividend Level-rShareholde1q                                  N
−
=−=
 
(3)
As you can see, the shareholder-level dividend taxes in equation (3) cancel out, demonstrating 
that the level of corporate investment is influenced only by corporate tax rates and capital gains 
tax rates. Rewriting equation (3) reveals that the value to the individual of the return per initial 
dollar invested is as follows:       
 
     Rate)Tax  Gains Captial Rate)(1Tax  Corporate Return)(1 of RateTax -Before(q        N −−=  (4)
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Thus, while a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend tax rates will increase the price of 
the stock, unless coupled with a change in capital gains tax rates, it will not result in a change in 
corporate investments or dividend payment policies (Poterba and Summers, 1985). 
 
Double Taxation View  
 
Similar to tax capitalization view, the double taxation view contends that shareholder-
level dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The shareholder’s after-tax return 
is calculated in equation (5): 
 
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate Tax 
Rate)]      * [(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax Rate) 
+ (1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)] 
(5)
  
The twist is that the double taxation view holds that despite their tax disadvantage, shareholders 
reward corporations when they pay dividends by increasing the stock price. Note that this differs 
from the tax capitalization view that stock prices rise when corporations reinvest instead of 
paying dividends. Proponents of the double taxation view do not claim to know the reason for 
the increase in stock price but simply accept that the market rewards corporations when they pay 
dividends (Poterba and Summer, 1985; McClure, 1977). Therefore, as shown below in equation 
(6), the shareholder’s required rate of return (corporations’ cost of capital) depends on corporate 
taxes and the weighted average of shareholder-level dividend and capital gains taxes: 
 
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate 
Tax Rate)] * [(w)(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax 
Rate) 
+ (1 – w) (1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)] 
(6) 
 
where (w) is the weight shareholders place on dividend taxes, which depends on the dividend 
payout ratio. When dividend payout ratios are high, shareholders place less weight on 
shareholder-level dividend taxes (w) and more weight on capital gain taxes (1- w). This reduces 
the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and the shareholder’s required rate 
of return. This lower weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains entices firms to 
pay dividends despite their tax disadvantages (Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and Summers, 1985). A 
decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes decreases the amount corporations have to pay for 
the shareholder’s after-tax dividend to remain constant. In other words the decrease in 
shareholder-level dividend taxes reduces the cost of paying dividends and receiving the increase 
in stock price. This motivates the corporation to increase the dividend payout ratio, decreasing 
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the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and increasing investment (Zodrow, 
1991; Poterba and Summers 1985). 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Prior research examines the three corporate dividend policy views in a variety of settings. 
The literature has not reached a consensus as to the correct view. The three views of corporate 
dividend policy, the tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalization view and the double taxation 
view, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They could each hold true for certain corporations 
under certain conditions (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 2). 
The first of the three corporate dividend policy views is the tax irrelevance view. Under 
this view, a corporation’s decision to invest is independent of its decision to pay dividends 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Miller and Scholes (1978) warn that many studies rely on short-
term responses to dividends when testing the relationship between taxes and dividend yield or 
the relationship between taxes and rate of return. As a result, findings that do not support the tax 
irrelevance view often are suspect. They demonstrate that dividend announcement effects, which 
also increase rates of return in the short run, bias these studies by creating short-term price 
increases.  
The tax irrelevance view assumes operation in perfect capital markets; everyone in the 
market has the same expectations of future earnings and amount of risk involved. In other words, 
everyone participating in the market has the same information set (Mougoue and Mukherjee, 
1994). But, researchers have found evidence that managers have superior information regarding 
their corporations. Since information asymmetry exists, dividends provide a signal to the market 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Ross, 1977).  
The tax irrelevance view also assumes transaction costs and taxes do not exist (Mougoue 
and Mukherjee, 1994). However, Easterbrook (1984) contends that not only do taxation costs 
exist but agency costs also influence dividend payments. Managers are imperfect agents of 
investors, and paying dividends helps to restrict their discretion.  
The second corporate dividend policy view, the tax capitalization view states that despite 
the fact that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporations’ profits, 
shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share values. The after-tax appreciation of the 
stock equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. Thus, a permanent change in dividend 
taxation, unless coupled with a change in capital gains taxation, will not result in a change in 
corporate investments or dividend policies (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 15; Zodrow, 1991, 
500).  
Looking at the financing choices of corporations, Masulis (1980) finds that stock prices 
increase when corporations exchange debt for equity and decrease when corporations exchange 
equity for debt. In his opinion, this supports the tax capitalization view: when debt replaces 
equity, stock prices increase because they now incorporate future dividends into the price. 
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Contrary to Masulis’ study (1980), Myers-Majluf’s theory (1984) predicts the opposite: 
corporations tend to issue equity when their shares are over-valued. Consistently, Masulis and 
Korwar (1986) and Vermaelen (1981) find that new stock issues lower stock prices while 
repurchases raise stock prices.  
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue in favor of the tax capitalization view by showing that 
stock prices fall on ex-dividend days. The stock price falls because the dividend is no longer 
included in the stock price. Eades et al. (1984) refute this finding by demonstrating that stock 
dividends, which are not subject to a shareholder-level tax, produce similar results in the stock 
prices on ex-dividend dates. 
Fama and French (1997) also look for evidence in support of the tax capitalization view 
using asset pricing models. If the tax capitalization hypothesis is true, they expect a negative 
relationship between corporate value and dividend payments. When a corporation pays 
dividends, the payout should no longer be included in the firm’s future value; thus, the stock 
price should decline. Instead, they find a positive relationship between firm value and dividends 
and a negative relationship between leverage and value. They conclude that dividends and debt 
convey information to the market about profitability that is not captured elsewhere. 
This potential for dividend signaling and the restriction of manager discretion is 
incorporated into the third view, the double taxation view (Poterba and Summers, 1985; 
McClure, 1977). Similar to dividend tax capitalization, this view contends that shareholder-level 
dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The double taxation view holds that 
despite their tax disadvantage, shareholders still reward corporations when they pay dividends by 
increasing the corporate value (Poterba and Summers, 1985; McClure, 1977). The higher the 
dividend payout ratio, the lower the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains, and 
the lower the shareholder’s required rate of return (Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and Summers, 1985).  
Using British data before and after changes in the way Great Britain taxes corporate 
retained and distributed income, Poterba and Summers (1985) find that the double taxation view 
is the closest match to their results and reject both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization 
views. Their results show that changes in dividend taxation significantly impact ex-dividend 
price movements.  Dhaliwal et al. (2003) also use the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 to 
investigate the effects of the increase in the highest individual tax bracket on stock prices. They 
document a positive relationship between dividend yield and long-term stock returns which is 
mitigated by institutional ownership which supports the traditional double taxation view.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
This paper examines a shareholder-level dividend tax in two countries which have 
different tax treatments for R&D investment and which change their shareholder-level dividend 
tax policies over the time period investigated. Since firms often deduct R&D in the year 
incurred, R&D investment is tax favored in comparison to capital investment. Additional R&D 
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tax incentives come in a multitude of guises. Tax regimes can offer R&D tax credits based on 
flat rates (Canada), R&D tax credits based on incremental rates above a base (France, Japan, 
Spain, and the United States), or super-deductibility (more than 100 percent) of R&D expenses 
(Austria and Australia). Researchers still debate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in 
increasing R&D investment and the organizational factors influencing this investment 
(Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; Goel, 1990; Hill and Snell, 1989; Bradley et al., 1984; Link and 
Long, 1981).  
In July of 1985, Australia implemented an R&D investment tax incentive in the form of 
super-deductibility. Super-deductibility permitted companies to deduct 150 percent of their R&D 
expenses. While New Zealand did not offer an explicit tax R&D incentive, R&D expenses were 
100 percent deductible. I use the same classification approach as Thomas et al. (2003) and do not 
classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D deduction as countries offering incentives for 
investment in R&D. During this study, both New Zealand and Australia also begin taxing 
corporate profits only once through dividend imputation credits. Though countries can 
implement such credits in a variety of ways, the net effect of a dividend imputation credit is to 
reduce the double taxation of dividends by reducing the tax shareholders pay on dividend income 
they receive. Table 3 summarizes these changes and defines the four tax regimes. 
 
Table 3:  Tax Regimes 
 Time  Period R&D Investment 
Incentive 
Dividend 
Payment Incentive 
Tax Regime I Australia prior to July 1985 
New Zealand prior to April 1988 No No 
Tax Regime II Australia from July 1985 to June 1987 Yes No 
Tax Regime III New Zealand after March 1988 No Yes 
Tax Regime IV Australia after June 1987 Yes Yes 
 
Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Absence of Explicit R&D Incentives 
 
The dividend policy views vary in their predictions of the effects of a dividend 
imputation credit. As summarized in Table 2, Panel A, the tax irrelevance view predicts that 
dividend imputation credits will not change the dividend payment or the relationship between 
R&D investment and dividend payment. Similarly, the tax capitalization view states that any 
change in the dividend payment is the result of a change in the firm’s corporate investment 
opportunities; thus, a dividend imputation credit will not change the firm’s corporate investment 
policy. 
Only the double taxation view of dividend policy suggests that a change in the way 
dividends are taxed will alter the dividend payment. According to this view, the market rewards 
dividend-paying firms by increasing stock prices when firms pay dividends. A decrease in the 
dividend tax decreases the amount of pre-tax dividend necessary for shareholders to receive the 
same after-tax dividend. This reduction in the cost of equity capital reduces the firm’s cost of 
receiving the market’s reward of an increased stock price. Thus, capital investment and the 
dividend payout ratio will increase (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 4). As mentioned earlier, prior 
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corporate dividend policy research does not address R&D investment alone. Instead it either 
includes it as part of capital investment or excludes it completely. Thus, the double taxation view 
of corporate dividend policy does not predict a direction for the change in R&D investment 
(Table 2, Panel A). Following a decrease in dividend taxes, the increases in the capital 
investment and dividend payment predicted by the double taxation view have to be funded by 
either the decrease in the average cost of capital, newly raised capital or as suggested by Thomas 
et al. (2003), a decrease in R&D investments. New Zealand’s 1988 tax change provides a setting 
in which to explore these relationships and dividend views.  
In 1988, New Zealand changed its tax regime from one offering tax incentives for neither 
R&D investment nor dividend payment to one offering tax incentives for paying dividends. New 
Zealand did continue to offer immediate deduction of 100 percent of the R&D expenses. To be 
consistent with prior literature, the 100 percent deduction is not classified as an explicit incentive 
to invest in R&D. According to Thomas et al. (2003), after this change, New Zealand firms that 
typically paid dividends should have now found paying dividends more attractive than investing 
in R&D. At this time, New Zealand also decreased its highest corporate tax rate by 15 percentage 
points (from 48 to 33 percent). This reduced the tax benefit of the implicit incentive for R&D 
investment, making the incentive for the payment of dividends even stronger. This does not alter 
the predictions under the double taxation view. However, corporate tax rates affect the cost of 
capital calculation under both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views of corporate 
dividend policy. Reducing the cost of capital results in an increase in capital investments 
according to both of these views (McKenzie and Thompson, 1997; Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and 
Summers, 1985; Miller and Scholes, 1978). Panels A and B of Table 2 summarize the effects 
these tax changes should have on dividend-paying firms and their R&D investment, capital 
investment, and dividend payment according to the three views of how dividend taxes affect 
corporate dividend policies.  
Defining Tax Regime III as providing only a tax incentive for dividend payment (Table 
3), the first hypothesis is as follows:. 
 
H1a  When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-
paying firms will alter their R&D investment. 
 
H1b  When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-
paying firms will increase their capital investment. 
 
H1:  When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-
paying firms will increase their dividend payment. 
 
Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Presence of Explicit R&D Incentives 
 
Australia’s 1987 tax change also provides a setting in which to test the relationships 
among the uses of firm resources and the views of what affects corporate dividend policy. In July 
of 1987, Australia altered its tax regime from one offering tax incentives only for R&D 
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investment (defined as Tax Regime II in Table 3) to one offering tax incentives both for R&D 
investment and dividend payments (defined as Tax Regime IV in Table 2). According to the 
double taxation view, the implementation of a dividend imputation credit will directly impact the 
payment of dividends in dividend-paying firms (Table 2, Panel C). The dividend imputation 
credit allows firms to pay less in dividends while shareholders receive the same after-tax 
dividend payment. The reduced equity costs make paying dividends and capital investments 
attractive uses of firm resources (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 4).  
At this time, Australia also implemented a capital gains tax. A capital gains tax would not 
cause a change in the dividend payment or investment policy under the tax irrelevance view. The 
tax capitalization view contends that implementing a capital gains tax will decrease the after-tax 
appreciation shareholders receive when they sell their stock (Table 2, Panel D). In turn, this will 
increase the cost of capital and discourage capital investment (McKenzie and Thompson, 1997, 
9). Under the double taxation view, the cost of capital depends on a weighted average of 
shareholder-level dividend taxes and capital gains taxes. An increase in capital gains taxes alone 
would increase a firm’s cost of capital. This increase in the cost of capital would decrease 
investments and dividend payout ratios. However, when coupled with dividend imputation which 
as discussed above, has the opposite effect on the cost of capital, it is not possible to predict the 
movement in R&D investment, capital investment, or dividend payment. 
 
H2a  When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-
paying firms will alter R&D investment. 
 
H2b  When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-
paying firms will increase capital investment.  
 
H2c  When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-
paying firms will increase dividend payment.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To test the hypotheses, I examine pooled cross-section firm-year Australian and New 
Zealand data from the fiscal year ending 1982 to the fiscal year ending 1993. Where available, 
the data comes from the Worldscope Global Researcher Database via Thompson Financial and 
Datastream Advance 4.0. The remainder of the data is hand-collected from the Australian 
Graduate School of Management Annual Report File and the Australian Stock Exchange annual 
reports housed in Perth, Western Australia. Only domestic dividend-paying firms are kept in the 
sample since these are the firms which will be most affected by a tax change in their country. 
Consistent with Thomas et al. (2003), this paper defines domestic firms as those with (1) less 
than 50 percent of their total sales due to foreign sales, (2) less than 50 percent of their total 
assets located abroad, and (3) less than 50 percent of their total income due to foreign income. 
The complete sample contains 498 firm-year observations.  
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In each case, I deflate R&D expense and capital expenditures by size. I deflate dividend 
payment by earnings. To test each hypothesis, I use the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test. I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test because Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the 
null hypothesis of equal variances in the each of the deflated variables, and thus the parametric t-
test would not be appropriate. I use a two-tailed test when the hypothesis is non-directional and a 
one-tailed test when the hypothesis is directional. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The first hypothesis investigates actions of dividend-paying firms moving from Tax 
Regime I to Tax Regime III—New Zealand before and after dividend imputation. H1 compares 
the amounts of dividend payment, capital investment, and R&D investment in Tax Regime II 
with Tax Regime IV, to determine the dominant dividend policy view. Using the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to investigate H1a reveals that R&D expense deflated by size 
changed (decreased) significantly (z = 1.80, p = 0.0714) after dividend imputation. Running the 
same test on capital expenditures, deflated by size and dividend payment, deflated by earnings 
investigates H1b and H1c. The results do not show a significant change in the median of capital 
expenditures; thus, H1b is not supported. However, they do indicate a marginally significant 
increase in dividend payment (z = -1.25, p = 0.10) after dividend imputation, supporting H1c. 
When New Zealand moved from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, it also lowered its corporate 
tax rate. As Table 2, Panel B shows, all of the corporate dividend policy views predict that R&D 
investment could change and that capital expenditures should increase after moving from Tax 
Regime I to Tax Regime III. Further while the double taxation view suggests that dividend 
payment should increase, the other two views also hold that it may. Since capital investment did 
not increase, the results cannot support one corporate dividend policy view over another. 
The second hypothesis compares dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime II 
with those operating under Tax Regime IV—Australia before and after the implementation of 
dividend imputation. H2 focuses on changes in investments and dividend payments to investigate 
the corporate dividend policy views. Running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on R&D and 
capital investment deflated by size and dividend payment deflated by earnings investigates the 
changes in these variables between the two tax regimes. None of these tests detect significant 
changes in the medians of these variables when operating under Tax Regime II versus Tax 
Regime IV. Table 2, Panel D, contains the predictions of the corporate dividend policy views.  
The tax irrelevance view predicts no changes in R&D investment, capital investment, or 
dividend payment. According to the tax capitalization view, R&D investment and dividend 
payment may increase. However, it also contends that the capital gains tax which was added 
under Tax Regime IV will decrease the after-tax appreciation shareholders receive when they 
sell their stock—increasing the cost of capital and decreasing capital investment. The double 
taxation view does not provide a prediction for the change since dividend imputation and capital 
gains affect the cost of capital in opposite directions. Thus when comparing the behavior of 
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dividend-paying firms in Tax Regime II to those in Tax Regime IV, I find support for only the 
tax irrelevance and double taxation views.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper highlights a void in the current corporate dividend policy views and shows the 
need for the inclusion of R&D investment. Traditionally these views have only considered 
capital investment, not R&D investment. This paper demonstrates that R&D and capital 
investments often move in opposite directions and that tax changes in shareholder-level dividend 
taxes affect the investment in R&D. Contingent on the R&D tax incentive in place, changes in 
shareholder-level dividend taxes may place pressure on firms to increase the amount of 
dividends paid while decreasing the amount of R&D investment. This study found that in both 
New Zealand and Australia, investment in R&D decreased after the implementation of dividend 
imputation. 
Decreases in investment in R&D could have a negative effect on economic growth since 
research shows that domestic R&D spending is linked to the rate of innovation and the ability to 
learn from others (Cameron, 1996; Salter and Martin, 2001). While on the surface, the payment 
of dividends and R&D investment may seem unrelated, the results of this paper demonstrate this 
is not true. Therefore when a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes designed to stimulate 
economic growth is implemented, economic growth may be negated by a decrease in R&D 
investment. 
Further, when investigating the results of a tax regime simultaneously ceasing to tax 
dividends at the shareholder-level and lowering corporate tax rates, I do not find support for any 
of the current corporate dividend policy views (Table 2, Panel A). I find that in dividend-paying 
firms, R&D investment and dividend payment change significantly. As shown in Table 3, Panel 
B, all three of the corporate dividend policy views predict an increase in capital investment. 
Since I do not find this, I cannot support one view over another in this setting.  
However, when investigating the results of a tax regime simultaneously ceasing to tax 
dividends and implementing a capital gains tax (Table 2, Panel C), I find support for the tax 
irrelevance and double taxation views in dividend-paying firms. I do not find the significant 
decrease in capital investment predicted by the tax capitalization view.  
More research is needed before the conclusions from this paper can be generalized to 
countries such as the United States. This is due primarily to the fact that unlike New Zealand and 
Australia during this paper’s sample period, the United States permits share repurchases. When a 
country allowing share repurchases, implements a dividend payment incentive, funding for 
increased dividend payments may be drawn from funds previously used for share repurchases 
instead of from R&D investment funds. Therefore, future study in countries permitting share 
repurchases is needed before we can generalize the results of this paper to the United States.   
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